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THE ADA THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS .1
"The year was 2001, and 'everybody was finally equal.'"'
Justice Scalia punctuated his biting dissent in PGA Tour, Inc.
v. Martin3 with this cynical foreshadowing: Supreme Court
misjudgment of the legislative intent of the Americans with
Disabilities Act ("ADA")4 will compel the judicial system to play
an "Alice in Wonderland" made-up game of distortion.' The goal
of the game: ubiquitous societal equality as prescribed by the
ADA. The resulting problem: the Court might just get what it
asked for. In his Martin dissent, Scalia likened current society,
and the Court's path, to Kurt Vonnegut's vision of future
American government,' where the playing field is leveled in
almost every activity imaginable by "imposing brain inhibitors
on the intelligent, placing leg weights on top ballet dancers,
and reducing the best boxers to the use of one hand,"7 all in the
name of social equality. Recent Supreme Court decisions
concerning disability and equality continue to distort the logic
of the ADA by fashioning absurd results that demonstrate the
ADA's shortcomings and the Court's unfamiliarity with the
statutory text and relevant legislative intent. Scalia's
prediction, however, is a fanciful one. Rather, statutory and
judicial shortcomings will probably lead to ineffective
protection against discrimination for disabled Americans.
© 2002 Lisa A. Sciallo. All Rights Reserved.
1 A reference to LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND &
THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS (Signet Classic 1960) (1865 & 1871).
2 PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 705 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(quoting Kurt Vonnegut, Harrison Bergeron, in ANIMAL FARM AND RELATED READINGS
129 (1997) [hereinafter Vonnegut]).
3 Martin, 532 U.S. at 705.
4 Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181, 12182 (2000).
5 Martin, 532 U.S. at 705.
6 Vonnegut, supra note 2, at 129, cited in Martin, 532 U.S. at 705 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
7 Todd A. Hentges, Driving in the Fairway Incurs No Penalty: Martin v. PGA
Tour, Inc. and Discriminatory Boundaries in the Americans with Disabilities Act, 18
LAW & INEQ. 131, 136 (2000).
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Thus, while the Court has yet to impose brain inhibitors on the
intelligent, in reality, the ADA resembles the stacks of fiction
literature more than anticipated.
This Note argues that recent Supreme Court decisions,
specifically Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v.
Williams,8 PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin,9 Sutton v. United Air
Lines, Inc."° and Bragdon v. Abbott," illuminate the ADA's
definitional ambiguities. The definition of "disabled" is not only
difficult for the judiciary to interpret, but also requires the
judiciary to inappropriately inquire into the severity of the
plaintiffs disability rather than into the defendant's
discriminatory actions. 2 This inquiry not only disempowers the
disabled plaintiff, both legally and personally, but leads to
unpredictable and inequitable results.
In the above-mentioned cases, the Supreme Court
compounded the problem by ignoring statutory and legislative
direction, thereby distorting the contours of the ADA beyond
the boundaries of legislative intent. 3 Reshaping the statute's
parameters rendered the text of the ADA simultaneously over-
inclusive and under-inclusive; in each case leaving the
congressionally-intended recipients of the benefit without
assistance. Where the Supreme Court attempts to protect the
physically disabled, its actions are commendable. However, the
Court's continued inattention to legislative direction suggests
its susceptibility to public opinion" and its inability to foresee
possibly deleterious legal and social ramifications. 5 Although
8 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
9 532 U.S. 661 (2001).
10 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
l1 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
12 Lisa Eichhorn, Major Litigation Activities Regarding Major Life Activities:
The Failure of the "Disability" Definition in the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990,
77 N.C. L. REV. 1405, 1469 (1999).
13 For example, in Bragdon, 524 U.S. 624, the Supreme Court failed to take
into consideration that the ADA's definition of disability requires that the "major life
[activity]" at issue be analyzed in terms of the traits "of such individual" rather than all
individuals in the plaintiffs situation. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2000). This erroneous
inquiry will lead to inequitable results. See discussion infra notes 148-56 and
accompanying text.
14 Martin, 532 U.S. at 691 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("In my view today's opinion
exercises a benevolent compassion that the law does not place it within our power to
impose."); see Arlene Mayerson & Matthew Diller, The Supreme Court's Nearsighted
View of the ADA, in AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE
LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS 124 (Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers
eds., 2000) [hereinafter AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES].
" See discussion of Sutton, infra, at notes 168-80 and accompanying text, and
Martin, infra, at notes 186-98 and accompanying text.
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the Court has recently arrived at socially palatable
conclusions,16 it arrived there with the wrong measuring stick.
Notwithstanding their benefits to many disabled people, the
Court's precedents could offset the rights of other social groups
and entities that American public policy has found it important
in the past to protect. 7 The ADA simply does not have the
elasticity to support such dramatic interpretive reshaping.
Instead of distorting statutory text, the Supreme Court
should circumvent statutory flaws and fissures and fashion its
opinions to better adhere to legislative intent, which directs the
courts to prioritize and protect the dignity and self-sufficiency
of disabled Americans.' 9 The statute mandates that the
plaintiff shoulder the burden of proving she is "truly
disabled."" This requirement generated a long line of
-convoluted and confusing caselaw, and also disempowers the
plaintiff by shifting the focus away from the defendant's
inappropriate conduct.2' Instead, a more effective way to adhere
16 1 am referring specifically to social commentary surrounding the Martin,
Sutton and Bragdon cases, discussion supra note 14 and infra notes, 18, 249. Note that
in examining lower court cases, Matthew Diller, an Associate Professor of Law at
Fordham University School of Law, expressed the opinion that substantial numbers of
courts have formulated restrictive interpretations of the ADA, which he claims have
unnecessarily and unfairly worked to the detriment of the plaintiffs. Matthew Diller,
Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model, 21 BERKLEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
19, 24 (2000). To substantiate his argument, he cites circuit and district court cases,
which seem to create a pattern-they all limit the plaintiffs' rights under the ADA. Id.
at 25. This Note focuses only on the ineptitude of the Supreme Court's reasoning. To
the extent that the cases cited by Diller negatively impact the plight of disabled
complainants under the ADA, they underscore the defective statutory parameters and
erroneous Supreme Court construction thereof. Firstly, perhaps these lower court
decisions were made in an attempt to reject the Supreme Court's clear misreadings of
the statute. Id. at 22. Secondly, these cases emphasize the ADA's faulty draftsmanship:
"[C]ourts are constrained from enforcing the [ADA] in a coherent and effective way by
statutory language that fails to reflect the goals of the law." Id. at 21. See also Cheryl
L. Anderson, "Deserving Disabilities". Why the Definition of Disability Under the
Americans With Disabilities Act Should Be Revised to Eliminate the Substantial
Limitation Requirement, 65 MO. L. REV. 83, 85-86 (2002) (citations omitted) (stating
that Martin diverted attention away from individuals with "genuine disabilities who
have been losing their cases under inappropriately narrow interpretations of the term
'disability").
I' For example, a recent expansion of a Title II case (Title II proscribes
discrimination emanating from public entities and services) improperly stretched the
legislative intent as well, thereby offsetting the rights of another vulnerable social
group: foster children. Doe v. County of Centre, 242 F.3d 437 (3d Cir. 2001) (discussed
infra notes 157-67 and accompanying text).
18 See Martin, 532 U.S. at 691 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The judgment distorts
the text of Title III, the structure of the ADA, and common sense.").
19 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2000).
20 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
21 See discussion infra note 241 and accompanying text.
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to legislative intent and to protect the dignity of disabled
Americans would be for Congress to amend the statute and
direct the courts to focus on the defendant's wrongful actions,
similar to the approach taken in intentional tort cases.2 2
At first blush, it seems unrealistic that an overhaul of
the text or judicial application of the ADA will have sweeping
and real positive effects for the disabled. The ten years of case
history that have fleshed out Title III of the ADA suggest that
the infrequency with which the cases are brought may not yield
an "Alice in Wonderland" effect, 3 and that the statute itself is
more symbolic than functional. However, if the courts continue
to interpret the ADA in accordance with Toyota, Martin, Sutton
and Bragdon, the statute will lose its potency; the statute as
applied will more closely resemble the vision evoked by the
Supreme Court than the original vision set forth by Congress. 4
This Note argues that the legitimacy and integrity of
our legal system requires a more concrete legislative mandate
regarding some of the ADA's definitions, a more focused
inquiry into the defendants' actions (as opposed to the
plaintiffs' disability) and a more discerning judicial analysis of
legislative structure and intent. Part I provides a history of the
enactment of the ADA and an overview of its practical
application. Part II reviews Supreme Court decisions
22 The statutory text of the ADA clearly contradicts legislative intent. See
discussion infra Part IV.
23 See generally Ruth Colker, ADA Title III: A Fragile Compromise, in
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES, supra note 14, at 293. See also Catherine J. Lanctot, Ad
Hoc Decision Making and Per Se Prejudice: How Individualizing the Determination of
"Disability" Undermines the ADA, 42 VILL. L. REV. 327, 327 n.10 (1997).
24 In which case, the ADA will resemble Alice in Wonderland more than
anticipated. Consider the following conversation between Alice and Humpty Dumpty:
Humpty Dumpty said gaily,.. ."that shows that there are three hundred and
sixty-four days when you might get un-birthday presents ... [a]nd only one
for birthday presents, you know. There's glory for you!"
"I don't know what you mean by 'glory,'" Alice said.
Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously. "Of course you don't-till I tell you.
I meant 'there's a nice knock-down argument for you!"
"But 'glory' doesn't mean a 'nice knock-down argument," Alice objected.
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, "it
means just what I chose it to mean-neither more nor less."
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so many
different things."
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master-that's all."
CARROLL, supra note 1, at 188.
By making the words mean what the Supreme Court chooses them to
mean, without reference to proper usage and intent, the Court is the "master," as was
Humpty Dumpty. The Court "interprets" by furnishing its own rules. However, unlike
Humpty Dumpty, its "shell" is much more impermeable than that of the real Humpty
Dumpty, as its decisions are rarely reversed.
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interpreting and ultimately distorting the fundamental
purpose of the ADA. This Part further analyzes the statutory
ambiguity of the ADA. Part III discusses the judicial and
societal goals affecting the application of the ADA, as well as
the ADA's past and future potency and success. Part IV
proposes remedies to the current state of affairs, arguing that
the legislature mandate or the courts adopt a case-by-case
analysis of ADA cases, implement a presumption of disability,
and more clearly delineate the boundaries of the ADA.
Additionally, this Part explores the possibility of state response
to congressional and judicial shortcomings. Finally, this Note
concludes in Part V with an invitation for Congress and the
Supreme Court to ameliorate the ADA's draftsmanship and
application.
I. HISTORY AND APPLICATION OF THE ADA
A- History of the ADA
While the 1964 Civil Rights Act (hereinafter the "CRA")
empowered those experiencing discrimination based on race,
color, national origin, sex and religion, those experiencing
discrimination based on disability were relegated to the
shadows and legally ignored.25 Although President Johnson and
the Supreme Court denounced discrimination against any
group of people as morally and socially wrong,26 it seemed as if,
for activists and politicians alike, eliminating discrimination
against some social groups was a more valuable goal than as
against others. Not until the 1970s did activists begin to
champion the rights of disabled Americans by seeking to
extend civil rights to the disabled.27 In 1973, Congress finally
addressed the need to protect disabled Americans by passing
the Rehabilitation Act.28
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 is the most far-reaching
of the ADA's predecessors.2" It enjoins recipients of federal
2' Leslie Francis & Anita Silvers, Achieving the Right to Live in the World:
Americans with Disabilities and the Civil Rights Tradition, in AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES, supra note 14, at xii-xv.
21 Id. at xiv.
27 Id. at xv.
28 Rehabilitation Act of 1973 §§ 503-505, 29 U.S.C. §§ 793-795 (2000).
29 The ADA's predecessors include: the Architectural Barriers Act of 1968,
Pub. L. No. 90-480, 82 Stat. 718 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4151-4157)
(1995)); the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-146, 89
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funds from excluding handicapped persons from public
accommodations and jobs."° Section 503 of the Rehabilitation
Act requires holders of federal contracts in excess of $10,000 to
"take affirmative action to employ and advance in employment
qualified individuals with disabilities,"3' whereas § 504
provides for "nondiscrimination under federal grants and
programs" generally.3 2 The expanse of § 504 had extensive and
direct ramifications, and therefore marked a huge triumph for
disabled Americans. The legislature not only imposed a major
financial disincentive for those entities that relied upon federal
funding to engage in discrimination, but also made clear its
moral disfavor of discrimination against the disabled. This
proved socially and politically empowering to disabled
Americans.
Although these provisions were certainly
groundbreaking at the time, many proponents of citizens with
disabilities recognized the limitations of the Rehabilitation Act.
For example, civil rights laws provided unmitigated protection
to women and minorities,33  whereas § 504 prohibits
discrimination "solely by reason of ... disability."4 Thus, the
implication was that disability discrimination is acceptable
when joined with other types of bias, and is punishable only
when it is found in its pristine form.35  Further, the
Rehabilitation Act is ineffectual to the extent that it does not
provide for a private right of action and does not give federal
agencies charged with enforcement the power to do anything
more than issue findings. 6
In response to the Rehabilitation Act's evident
shortcomings, agencies such as the National Council on the
Handicapped, the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights and
the American Civil Liberties Union helped to secure support for
protection of the disabled and ultimately contributed to the
Stat. 486 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1405-1406, 1415-1420) (2000)); the
Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-435,
98 Stat. 1678 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973ee) (2000)); and the Air Carrier
Access Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 100 Stat. 1080, cited in Francis & Silvers, supra
note 25, at xvii.
" Francis & Silvers, supra note 25, at xvii-xviii.
31 29 U.S.C. § 793(a).
32 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
33 Francis & Silvers, supra note 25, at xviii.
34 42 U.S.C. 794(a).
35 Francis & Silvers, supra note 25, at xviii.
36 Id. For example, unlike § 503, § 504 does not require affirmative action.
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introduction of many proposed, revised and amended versions
of the ADA. 7 President George H. W. Bush signed the bill on
July 26, 1990, marking an end to pervasive discrimination
against persons with disabilities. The 1990 congressional law
establishing the ADA represented "the most significant piece of
civil rights legislation enacted within the last twenty-five
years."38 The ADA changed the face of employment and civil
rights law irreversibly. 9
B. The Inner Workings of the ADA
The ADA's goal, ending discrimination against
individuals with disabilities and bringing those individuals into
the economic and social mainstream of American life,4° seemed
like an overwhelming and expensive undertaking. The
legislature crafted the structure of the ADA to extend the
Rehabilitation Act's non-discrimination principles to state and
local governments, public programs, activities and services,
whether or not they receive federal funding.4 The ADA tenders
the same civil rights protections to disabled Americans that the
CRA provided women and minorities beginning in 1964.42 The
ADA specifically prohibits a public entity from discriminating
against a qualified individual with a disability, or excluding
such an individual from participation in, or denying the
individual the benefits of, any of the entity's services, programs
' Id. at xix.
Robert C. Mathes, Civil Rights-The Status Of Persons Infected With
Asymptomatic HIV Under the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 After Bragdon-
Did The Supreme Court Miss an Opportunity to Protect Disabled Americans? Bragdon
v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 1196 (1998), 34 LAND & WATER L. REV. 237, 239 (citing LAURA F.
ROTHSTEIN, DISABILITIES AND THE LAW § 1.05, 23 (2d. ed. 1997)).
39 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(a)(2), (3), (5). Through the ADA, Congress for the first
time made sweeping findings in connection with disabled Americans, stating that more
than forty-three million Americans had at least one disability, that the segregation of
people with disabilities is a historical reality and the disabled receive inferior
educational and economic access to resources, amongst other things. See 42 U.S.C. §
12101(a)(1)-(9). See also H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 25 (1990) (citing Louis Harris
and Associates, The ICD [International Center for the Disabled] Survey of Disabled
Americans: Bringing Disabled Americans Into the Mainstream (1986)) ("Compared
with persons without disabilities, persons with disabilities are much poorer, have far
less education, have less social and community life, participate much less often in
social activities that other Americans regularly enjoy, and express less satisfaction
with life.").
'0 H.R. REP. No. 101-485 pt. 3, at 23 (1990).41 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(8), 12112(a); S. REP. No. 101-116, at 44 (1998); Helen L.
v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 331 (3d Cir. 1995); McDonald v. Massachusetts, 901 F. Supp.
471, 478 (D. Mass. 1995).
42 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a, 2000d, 2000e.
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or activities.43  The ADA provides more comprehensive
protection to the disabled than the the CRA provides to
minorities and women." However, the ADA and the CRA share
the same remedial provisions, such as compensatory and
punitive damages, injunctive relief and attorney's fees.45
An individual is "disabled" under all four titles of the
ADA if he or she has a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activities.46 Each of
the four titles provides its own unique, contextually-dependant
protection: Title I proscribes discrimination in the employment
sector;47 Title II proscribes discrimination emanating from
public entities and services;4" Title III proscribes discrimination
in the realm of public accommodation and services;49 and Title
IV assumes authority over other miscellaneous matters."
Titles I and III, the foci of this Note's discussion, apply
to discrimination against workers and patrons respectively,
within businesses and workplaces.51 Title III provides a broader
protection than Title I, because it applies to all individuals
with disabilities, regardless of whether they are sufficiently
qualified for employment.52 Whereas Title I functions to ensure
43 42 U.S.C. § 12132; H.R. REP. 101-485 pt. 3, at 23 (1990).
44 For example, the CRA covers only a few categories of public
accommodations. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a. See Colker, supra note 23 (providing history of
Title III).
0 See Colker, supra note 23 (providing history of Title III); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 12117(a).
46 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
47 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117. It states, in relevant part, "[n]o covered entity
shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the
disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring,
advancement, or discharge of employees.. . ." 42 U.S.C. § 12112.
48 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165. It states, in relevant part, "no qualified
individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from
participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a
public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
49 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189. Title III of the ADA provides that "[n]o
individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal
enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations
of any place of public accommodation by any person who ... operates a place of public
accommodation." 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (a).
50 42 U.S.C. §§ 12201-12213. Titles II and IV are outside the scope of this
Note.
51 It is interesting to note that the circuits split over whether Title II, the
public services title, applies to the terms and conditions of employment for government
workers. For a citation of cases relating to the circuit split, see Brief for Petitioner at
*29 n. 23, PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001) (No. 00-24), available at 2000
WL 1706732, which also notes the difference in wording and history between Title II
and Title III.
52 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (defining "qualified individual with a disability" as
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that employers have provided accommodations for their
employees and applicants with disabilities, 3 Title III operates
to ensure that these public businesses and workplaces also
provide their disabled patrons with appropriate
accommodations. 4 "Thus, it is the customer who triggers Title
III, just as it is the employee who triggers Title V Therefore,
both titles are devoted to eradicating discrimination within the
dual forces of the capitalist marketplace.
The Supreme Court spent the years surrounding the
turn of the twenty-first century testing the elasticity of the
ADA. 6 Prior to 1998, courts generally construed the term
"disability" narrowly, immunizing employer discrimination
from judicial redress and exposing what many viewed as the
judiciary's "blatant hostility towards the profound goals of the
ADA."57 Many commentators criticized this restrictive judicial
interpretation of the ADA.58 However, in 1998, the Supreme
Court decided Bragdon v. Abbott, expanding the scope of the
ADA by determining that HIV substantially impairs the "major
life activity" of human reproduction, and thus should be
considered a disability.59 In response, the media and critics
quickly accused the Court of expanding the ADA's text too far.6"
In 1999, the Court, in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
again restricted the rights of the disabled under the ADA by
reducing the likelihood of protection for those who have
mitigated their disabilities.6 PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin and
.an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can
perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds
or desires").
42 U.S.C. § 12112.
42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).
" William E. Spruill, Giving New Meaning to "Handicap:" The Americans
With Disabilities Act and its Uneasy Relationship with Professional Sports in PGA
Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 365, 384 (2001).
56 See generally Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184
(2002); PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
527 U.S. 471 (1999).
67 The goals of the ADA ostensibly are to provide as much protection as
possible to disabled Americans. Arlene B. Mayerson, Restoring Regard for the
"Regarded as" Prong: Giving Effect to Congressional Intent, 42 VILL. L. REV. 587, 587
(1997). See generally Symposium, Defining the Parameters of Coverage Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act: Who is "An Individual with a Disability?, 42 VILL. L.
REV. 327 (1997).
See, e.g., Mayerson, supra note 57.
59 524 U.S. 624, 641 (1998).
See, e.g., Jonathan R. Mook, Ruling that HIV is a Disability Could Open
Pandora's Box of ADA Claims, 6 EMP. L. STRATEGIST 1 (1998).
61 Sutton, 527 U.S. 471 at 492-94.
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Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams,
decided in 2001 and 2002 respectively, revealed the pendulous
nature of the Court's decision-making by expansively
interpreting the ADA in a manner reminiscent of the
permissiveness seen in Bragdon.6 2 In sum, sporadic judicial
interpretation of the ADA has exposed the great imprecision of
the statute, as well as the flawed grasp that the Court seems to
have on its terms and intent. This has, accordingly, roused fear
of the judicial potential to spur great and harmful changes in
the realm of business practices and civil rights in contradiction
to the ADA's legislative intent.3
II. SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE ON THE ADA
A. Relevant Case History
The Court in both Bragdon v. Abbott and Sutton v.
United Air Lines, Inc. expanded the definition of "disability"
and distorted the text of the ADA.64 In Bragdon, a dentist
refused to treat a patient because of the patient's affliction with
asymptomatic HIV, and the patient brought her cause of action
under Title III of the ADA.65 The patient asserted that she was
entitled, under Title III, to be provided with the same medical
accommodations as all other patients and that because this
discrimination was based on her disability alone, it was
illegal." The defendant countered that he should have been
able to refuse to treat the patient because the patient's
infectious condition posed a direct threat to the health and
safety of others.67 The Court remanded the case for a
determination as to whether the dentist's refusal to treat the
patient was reasonable in light of objective, scientific
information. 6 The importance of the case, however, lies in the
Court's determination that asymptomatic HIV is a disability
under the ADA. The Court stated that HIV substantially
62 See generally Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184
(2002); PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001).
0 See Beth Collins, The Americans With Disabilities Act: Rehabilitating
Congressional Intent, 28 J. LEGIS. 213 (2002).
6 See generally Sutton, 527 U.S. 471; Bragdon, 524 U.S. 624.
65 Bragdon, 524 U.S. 624.
0 Id. at 629.
67 Id. at 648.
6 Id. at 655.
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impairs the major life activity of human reproduction and thus,
should be considered a disability.69
The definition of "disability" was again at issue in the
more recent case of Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.70 In Sutton,
severely myopic job applicants brought a disability
discrimination action against United Air Lines under the ADA,
challenging the airline's minimum vision requirement for
global pilots.7 The job applicants claimed that their severe
vision impairments were a disability, that they were
discriminated against by reason of this disability and that the
airline was therefore liable under the employment provisions of
Title .72 The Court held that because corrective lenses
ameliorated the applicants' vision to a visual acuity of 20/20,
the plaintiffs were not substantially limited in any major life
activity.73 Thus, plaintiffs were non-disabled and ineligible to
enjoy the protective shelter of the ADA."
In Toyota, a more recent case, the legal question
concerned the scope of the definition of "disabled" as applied in
Title I situations where the "life activities" that are limited by
the impairment are work and manual tasks, amongst other
things. In Toyota, the claimant, Williams, worked at a Toyota
plant contributing to the production of automobiles. As a result
of her prolonged use of pneumatic tools, she developed carpal
tunnel syndrome, a wrist impairment, that she claimed
substantially limited her in performing manual tasks,
including housework, gardening and working." Because of this
affliction, she claimed that she was unable to perform her job,
which included paint inspection and surface repair of
automobiles.77 In response, Toyota placed her in a position
where she had to perform modified duties.78 Nonetheless,
Williams missed some work for medical leave, filed a claim
under workers' compensation, settled the claim and came back
to work.79 Upon Williams's return, her new position included
69 Id.
70 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
71 Id. at 476.
72 Id. at 476-79.
73 Id. at 488, 494.
74 id.
75 Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
76 Id. at 187-88.
7 Id. at 188-89.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 188.
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more intense physical activities, causing her ligament and
muscle problems to reappear in a more severe form.8" After she
requested reassignment back to her former position, Toyota
allegedly refused and terminated her employment.8' Plaintiff
alleged that she was fired on the basis of her affliction, and
that Toyota failed to provide reasonable accommodation as
required by the ADA.8"
The Sixth Circuit found that the plaintiff should have
shown that her manual disability disadvantageously affected a
"class" of manual activities that she was to perform at work."
Further, the court disregarded evidence that Williams could
not tend to her personal hygiene and could not carry out
personal or household chores, and justified this position by
claiming that these impairments did not substantially limit her
ability to perform the numerous manual tasks associated with
working on an assembly line.8"
In reversing the Sixth Circuit's decision, the Supreme
Court stated that when examining whether the condition is
severe or not, courts should perform an individualized
assessment.' The Court held that where the plaintiff claims
that her disability interferes with her major life activity of
working (performing manual tasks), the central inquiry is not
whether the claimant is able to perform tasks only associated
with her job, but whether the claimant is able to perform a
broad "class" of jobs, including a variety of tasks central to
most people's daily lives.88 Thus, because the plaintiffs
disability affected both her ability to work and to perform
manual tasks, the Court held that the Sixth Circuit should
have considered the plaintiffs inability to tend to her personal
hygiene and carry out her personal household chores in
deciding whether the impairment substantially limited her
major life activities.87 However, the Court reviewed the facts
and stated that this plaintiffs disabilities did not sufficiently
Toyota, 534 U.S. at 188-89.
81 Id. at 189-90.
82 Id. at 187-88.
Williams v. Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc., 224 F.3d 840 (6th Cir.
2000), rev'd, 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
84 Id.
Toyota, 534 U.S. at 199.
Id. at 199-200. The Toyota Court treated as relevant the plaintiffs inability
to carry out household tasks such as gardening and fixing breakfast, and personal
chores such as bathing and tooth brushing. Id. at 201-02.
87 Id. at 201-02.
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affect her performance of personal and household chores to
merit the statute's protection.8
Finally, the controversy in Martin surrounded the
definition of Title III's "public accommodation," rather than the
term "disability." In Martin, Casey Martin, a professional
golfer suffering from a circulatory disorder, needed to use a golf
cart to traverse the golf course.s9 His circulatory disorder
qualified as a disability as defined under the ADA.9° Martin
wanted to use his golf cart while competing in the private PGA
Tour, which at that time was held on a public course. Use of a
golf cart is in direct conflict with the "Rules of Golf' accepted by
PGA Tour, Inc. ("PGA") that require players to walk the length
of the course.9 ' Martin brought suit against the PGA, arguing
that he was an employee of the PGA and thus should receive
protection of Title 1.92 Martin also alleged that the PGA
discriminated against him in a place of public accommodation
in violation of Title III."3 As for Martin's first cause of action,
the district court deemed him an independent contractor and
thus denied his claim under Title V' The Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit affirmed.9' On Appeal, the Supreme Court
upheld the district court's Title I ruling, and approved Martin's
second cause of action.96
The PGA moved for summary judgment in the district
court on the grounds that it is exempt from coverage under
Title III of the ADA because it is a "private club[U or
establishment [," and that the play areas do not constitute
places of "public accommodation."9" The PGA maintained this
position throughout the appeals process and additionally
asserted, amongst other things, that Title III is concerned only
with discrimination against "clients and customers" seeking to
obtain "goods and services" at places of public accommodation.9"
" Id. at 202.
89 PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 661 (2001).
9' Id. at 666.
91 Id.
" Id. at 678.
93 Id. at 669.
Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1245 n.2 (D. Or. 1998)
(finding that Martin is an independent contractor, not an employee, and thus beyond
the protection of Title I).
95 Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 204 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2000).





Further, the PGA asserted that Casey Martin was neither a
client nor a customer of the PGA."9 The Supreme Court rejected
all of the PGA's arguments, holding that the golf course,
although used in a private PGA Tour, is a place of public
accommodation, and further that Martin indeed qualified as a
client or customer as he paid a $3,000 fee to participate in the
Q-School tournament, a qualifying tournament through which
members of the general public can participate and earn a place
on the PGA Tour.' 0 Further, the Court ruled that the use of the
cart did not significantly alter the nature of the game.
Therefore, Martin would be permitted to ride in his cart at
PGA events.'
B. Analysis: The Confusing Plight of Red Queen and White
Knight:".. The ADA's Imprecise Definitions and the
Court's Incorrect Interpretations
1. The Ambiguous Definition of "Disability"
The definition of "disability" as set forth in 42 U.S.C. §
12102(2) is applicable to all four titles of the ADA. Thus, its
ambiguity has a major impact on every ADA proceeding,
including the employment and public accommodation
discrimination cases discussed herein. A plaintiff must prove
that she has a disability before she can continue with her suit
under any of the titles. 12 The statute defines disability as "(A) a
Id. The PGA asserted that this claim of discrimination was more job-
related and therefore could only be brought under Title I. However, as the district court
found, Title I was inapplicable to Martin here because Martin was an independent
contractor rather than an employee. Id.
100 Id. at 679-80. See also Tim A. Baker, The Law and the Links: How Casey
Martin Prevailed in his Legal Battle with the PGA Tour, RES GESTAE, Sept. 2001, at 17.
... Martin, 532 U.S. at 683, 690.
102 The Red Queen and White Knight reference characters in Lewis Carroll's
novel, Alice's Adventures in Wonderland & Through the Looking Glass. In my version
of Carroll's story, the Supreme Court takes the place of the Red Queen, who is
"domineering and often unpleasant, but not incapable of civility. She expects Alice to
abide by her rules of proper etiquette, even when it should be apparent that she does
not know what is happening." Characters, Sparknotes, at http://www.sparknotes.com/-
litlalice/characters.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2002). The White Knight, on the other
hand, is like the ADA itself: "[k]ind, gentle, and strangely noble, despite [its] extreme
clumsiness. [It] tries to be very clever, but fails in the end." Id.
'o' As Lisa Eichhorn notes, Titles I and II of the ADA prohibit discrimination
against qualified individuals with disabilities, and Title III, although it is not framed
in terms of a protected class of individuals with disabilities, requires a plaintiff to prove
her disability in order for the Court to determine whether discrimination on a
prohibited basis occurred. Eichhorn, supra note 12, at 1473.
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physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record
of such impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such
impairment."" 4 This broad and ambiguous definition leaves the
statute susceptible to an infinite array of interpretations, 5 a
problem exacerbated by the natural difficulty in defining the
concept of disability as compared to race or sex.
The drafters of the ADA drafted the statutory language
in an attempt to clarify past ambiguities within the
Rehabilitation Act.0  Congress directed that the ADA grant at
least as much protection as provided by the Rehabilitation Act
regulations. 7 The ADA maps out rights and obligations with
greater specificity than the Rehabilitation Act.' For example,
Title III articulates a balancing test for weighing the right to
access public accommodation against the burden of providing
such accommodation. 9 However, in this instance greater
specificity does not amount to greater utility or easier
interpretation.
Even if a claimant proves that she has a disability, she
still has not fully met her statutory burden. She has to further
prove that the impairment not only affects a major life activity,
but that it substantially limits that activity.110 The definition of
what "substantially limits one or more major life activities"" is
so convoluted that it prevents courts from fulfilling the ADA's
goal to have disabled people fully participating in society."'
Legislative history is silent regarding the reasoning behind the
104 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000).
105 Patricia Illingworth & Wendy E. Parmet, Positively Disabled: The
Relationship Between the Definition of Disability and Rights Under the ADA, in
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES, supra note 14, at 3, 3. This is perverse given that
Congress announced that its purpose in passing the ADA was "to provide a clear and
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities." 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1).
'06 Eichhorn, supra note 12, at 1421.
107 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) states: "Except as otherwise provided in this chapter,
nothing in this chapter shall be construed to apply a lesser standard than the
standards applied under title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 790 et seq.)
or the regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant to such title."
"8 Eichhorn, supra note 12, at 1421.
109 Id. at 1422. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(A)(iii)-(v), the place of public
accommodation shall take steps to alter the nature of the facility, service or
accommodation to the extent that the alteration is readily achievable, is available
through alternate methods or will not result in an undue burden.
110 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).
1 Id.
Eichhorn, supra note 12, at 1423.
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use of such language,' although in 1990 Congress set forth a
non-exhaustive list of impairments and disabilities that would
qualify a claimant to bring his or her claim under the ambit of
the ADA."4 If a plaintiff is unable to perform activities such as
"caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking,
seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning and working,"
she is considered disabled."5 The list is varied in that it
describes functions that range from crucial (breathing) to the
arguably more inconsequential (working, caring for oneself)." 6
This variation makes it difficult for courts to discern
congressional priorities.1 7
The statute's infirmity is best demonstrated by an
analysis of the major life activity of "working""8 in Title I
employment cases. In order for the complainant to prove that
she is disabled, she must prove that she has an impairment
that limits a major life activity."9 One of the major life
activities that a plaintiff can prove she is unable to perform due
to her impairment is the ability to work.2° If a plaintiff
claiming an impairment to the major life activity of working
seeks protection of the statute, she must show not only that she
has a disability and that the discrimination against her was
based on this disability, but also that she can perform the
essential function of the job that she holds or desires. 2' The
complainant is thus required to perform something just short of
magic for the court. She has to show that her ability to work is
impaired enough for her to be deemed disabled, and that she is
simultaneously able to perform the essential functions of the
job. This inherent tension within the statutory scheme
underscores the importance for the legislature to redraft the
statute in order to redirect the judicial inquiry from the
disability status of the plaintiff to the biased acts of the
defendant.
The ambiguity inherent in the major life activity of
working compelled the Court to conduct an improper inquiry in
m Id. at 1428.
14 H.R. Rep. 101-485 pt. 3, at 28.
Id.; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2001).
'16 See Eichhorn, supra note 12, at 1429.
117 See id.
118 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii).
119 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994).
120 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii).
121 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
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contravention of the equality of opportunity ideology that
underpins the ADA. For example, the Court in Toyota
confronted the problem of determining the scope of the major
life activity of working. 122 The statute is unclear as to whether
the claimant must be impaired in performing just her job, or a
broad range of jobs that include manual activities, in order to
receive statutory protection when the limitation affects the
activity of work. 123 The Court ultimately decided that when the
judiciary inquires into the major life activity of working, the
claimant's limitation should be analyzed with respect to a
"class" of jobs, not whether the claimant is unable to perform
the tasks associated with her specific job.24
Because the ADA mandates that courts determine
statutory violations based on the extent of the claimant's
physical impairments, the Court inevitably splits hairs and
sets contradictory precedents. First, the Court's determination
in Toyota means that in the future, claimants' physical
limitations will be analyzed differently depending upon
whether the claimant asserts that her disability affects her job,
or whether it affects her ability to walk.'25 This approach sets
the stage for claim-specific judicial inquiry, thereby making
this already thorny and tedious litigation path more onerous
for both the litigants and the courts. I
Second, not only will Toyota foster judicial
unpredictability, but its holding will potentially complicate and
weaken judicial reasoning going forward. For example, in
Toyota, the Court determined that in deciding whether a
claimant has a physical impairment, an individualized
assessment is appropriate because physical symptoms vary
from person to person.'26 However, in determining that the
122 Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
12" Id. at 199-200 (citing Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999)).
12A Id. at 200. The Court referred to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC") regulation, which describes what the EEOC has determined the
term "substantially limits" to mean with respect to the major life activity of working.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3).
125 Toyota, 534 U.S. at 200-01. Although the Court followed the EEOC's
guidance to do this, it should have considered the negative repercussions that flow
from splintering the ADA into claim-dependent sub-issues. The Court should be more
comfortable with construing the terms of the ADA in the most logical and equitable
way possible, despite contradicting agency guidance, because Congress did not convey
to any agency the power to define the terms of the ADA. See infra text accompanying
notes 134-40. As it is, the Court historically has given these agency guidelines a
fluctuating degree of deference. See id.
126 Toyota, 534 U.S. at 198.
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claimant's disability affects the major life activity of working,
the Court stated that the judiciary should employ a class-based
approach.'27 These confusing directives require plaintiffs who
allegedly have disabilities affecting their work to prove that
they have physical impairments that are uniquely severe, and
at the same time are general enough to affect potential work in
a broad range of jobs in which many other people engage. 28 A
simultaneously individualized and generalized inquiry reveals
the weakness of the statutory structure and the infirm judicial
grasp on its contours. The different-rules-for-different-life-
activities approach is a neither logical nor efficient judicial
strategy, and is one that will convolute judicial investigation
immeasurably.
To add to the confusion, the Toyota decision differs from
the Bragdon decision in its acceptance of the individualized
analysis. As stated above, the Court in Toyota determined that
an individualized assessment is appropriate when determining
disability, echoing the Court in Sutton.'29 The Court in
Bragdon, however, failed to consider the plaintiffs alleged
limitation of a major life activity on an individualized basis.3 °
The Court's inattention to statutory text and to legislative
intent exposes the unpredictability of its future rulings. The
judiciary needs a more rational analytic focus, one that centers
on the defendant's alleged impropriety instead of the plaintiffs
amorphously-defined disability.
The "substantially limits a major life activity" language
also compels the courts to inappropriately inject their own
subjective value judgments into their judicial assessments. The
requirement that petitioners prove themselves "truly disabled"
within the legislative construct of a "major" disability has the
judiciary asking the wrong questions. When the Court
scrutinizes the value of the plaintiffs disability for the
purposes of approving entrance through the courthouse doors,
it disempowers the plaintiff by shifting the focus away from the
defendant's inappropriate conduct and toward the plaintiffs
"' Id. at 199-200 (discussed supra text accompanying notes 122-24).
128 Id.
1"9 Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 483 (1999) (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102(2) (1998)).
130 As Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas and
O'Connor noted, the Bragdon Court avoided giving due consideration to 42 U.S.C. §
12102(2)(A) (1994). Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 658 (1998) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, and
O'Connor, J., joining as to Part II).
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status as disabled.'31 Further, an inquiry into what is and what
is not a "major" disability is akin to an inquiry into what gives
humans their value; one who cannot perform a major life
activity does not have much of a life in the eyes of the ADA.'32
Contrary to the aim of the disability movement, this method of
inquiry requires the courts to focus on what the disabled
cannot do rather than what they can do and thereby belittles
the value of their lives."'
Because of the aforementioned statutory ambiguities,
the Court became confused by the definition of "disability" and
thus looked to agency regulations for guidance."' Congress has
not delegated to any agency the authority to interpret the term
"disability.""' Nonetheless, agencies such as the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare ("HHS") and the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") have issued
their own interpretive lists of the term "disability." 36 The
Bragdon Court, to determine if reproduction is a major life
activity, looked to the HHS interpretation of the Rehabilitation
Act for a more detailed definition of "physical or mental
impairment.""7 The Sutton Court considered the EEOC's
regulations as potential guidance for the proper interpretation
of the term but ultimately rejected the agency's definition."8
Whereas the Court in Bragdon embraced agency interpretation
131 Eichhorn, supra note 12, at 1469.
132 Id. at 1429. One can argue that this is the best type of inquiry for the
purposes of ensuring extension of ADA protection only to those who are most in need of
such protection. The ADA, however, forces this type of analysis and accompanying
value judgment without weighing the impact and nature of the discrimination in
question.
"' Id. at 1430.
134 Sutton, 527 U.S. at 480-82 (discussing the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission's definition of "disability"); Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 631-33 (discussing the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare's definition of "physical or mental
impairment").
135 Sutton, 527 U.S. at 479 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000)).
136 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i) (1997).
In 1980 the Department of Health, Education and Welfare became the
Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS").
'3' Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 632. The Court looked at regulations issued by HHS
interpreting the Rehabilitation Act, which define "physical or mental impairment" to
mean: "(A) any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or
anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological;
musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory, including speech organs;
cardiovascular; reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary ... " Id. (citing 45 C.F.R. §
84.3(j)(2)(i) (1997)).
138 Sutton, 527 U.S. at 479-80. The Court looked at regulations issued by the




of "disability,""9 the Court in Sutton gave no deference to the
EEOC's guideline that the question of whether or not a person
has a disability should be assessed without regard to
mitigating measures.4 9 The ADA legislative history is not
sufficiently detailed regarding the definition of "disabled" to
provide courts with guidance when faced with various fact
patterns, therefore it invites the Court to consider agency
interpretations. Further, the amount of deference that the
Court will afford to agency interpretation is unpredictable. The
legislature should therefore refine the definition of "disabled."
In order to ameliorate this improper statutory scheme,
Congress should revise the ADA to define an illegal departure
from the law in terms of the defendant's improper stereotyping
rather than the severity of the plaintiffs disability. 4' Plaintiffs
under the ADA should have the same ease of access to the
justice system as those under the CRA; women and persons of
color need not prove their sex or race, and the disabled plaintiff
should not be forced to prove her disability.' A defendant-
focused inquiry is more compatible with the spirit of the
legislative intent that the ADA should lead to equitable
results. "
2. The Supreme Court's Incorrect Interpretation of
"Disability" and its Related Terms
If Congress insists upon having a plaintiff-focused
pleading standard, it should give clearer directives with
reference to the nuanced application of the "disability"
definition. Without a clear legislative mandate, the Court has
leeway to make decisions in contravention of legislative
intent."" As a result, the Court has incorrectly interpreted the
term "disability."
139 Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 632-33.
140 Sutton, 527 U.S. at 480-82 (stating, "[alithough the parties dispute the
persuasive force of these interpretive guidelines, we have no need in this case to decide
what deference is due .... We conclude that respondent is correct that the approach
adopted by the agency guidelines-that persons are to be evaluated in their
hypothetical uncorrected state-is an impermissible interpretation of the ADA.")
141 Eichhorn, supra note 12, at 1474.
142 Id. at 1424-25.
141 Id. at 1470.
144 Diller, supra note 16, at 21 (stating that the ADA is poorly drafted in light
of congressional purposes, thereby constraining courts from enforcing the ADA in a
coherent and effective way).
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For example, the Court in Bragdon had little
congressional guidance when it faced the difficult task of
deciding whether asymptomatic HIV falls within the ADA's
definition of disability.'45 Prior to Bragdon, Congress already
established that HIV is a disability under the ADA.46 For
asymptomatic HIV to qualify under the ADA, however, it must
affect a major life activity. As stated above, the Court
determined that asymptomatic HIV qualifies as a disability
because it affects the major life activity of reproduction.'47
The Bragdon Court failed to consider that the ADA's
definition of a disability requires that the major life activity at
issue be analyzed in terms of the traits "of such individual."'48
The proper inquiry would have been whether the plaintiff
herself did or did not engage in life activities that included
such pursuits as reproduction.' The Court's decision in
Bragdon therefore excludes individuals who should receive the
ADA's protection and includes those who should not. 50
145 Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 624.
I" H.R. REP. No. 101-485 pt. 3, at 28.
147 Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 639 (holding that the Rehabilitation Act regulations
support the inclusion of reproduction as a major life activity).
148 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2000). It is interesting to note that Chief Justice
Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas and O'Connor assert that the Bragdon
majority avoided giving due consideration to this requirement of the ADA. Chief
Justice Rehnquist states that the Court "truncates the question, perhaps because there
is not a shred of record evidence indicating that, prior to becoming infected with HIV,
respondent's major life activities included reproduction." Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 658
(Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia, J., & Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part, and O'Connor, J., joining as to Part II). Also note that the Sutton
Court explicitly and wholeheartedly embraced the "with respect to an individual"
requirement when it disapproved statutory coverage for a corrected case of severe
myopia. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 483.
149 Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 658 (Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia & Thomas, JJ.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, and O'Connor, J., joining as
to Part II). It is important to note that an individual inquiry can sometimes be unjustly
applied, as it does not allow room for a complainant's change of heart. Consider, for
example, if the complainant in this case, despite her initial assertion that she did not
want children, decided in the future that childbearing was a viable and desirable
option for her. In that scenario, individual inquiry would disappoint justice. Problems
flowing from not conducting this individual inquiry, however, are equally as vexing on
a societal level. The bottom line is that both legislation and caselaw have laid out the
requirement that this be an individualized inquiry. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (stating that
disability determination must be made "with respect to such individual"); Albertson's,
Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 567 (1999) (finding that monocular vision is not
invariably a disability, but must be analyzed on an individual basis). Therefore, the
legislature made, and the Court interpreted, value judgments. By oscillating between
an individual and a "most people" inquiry, the Court garners the approval of social
consensus and deflates the legitimacy of its rulings.
'6o Mathes, supra note 38, at 253-61.
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First, the Court's decision allows future courts to utilize
the major life activity of reproduction as a tool to single out
those plaintiffs with HIV, as well as other attributes
prohibitive to reproduction, and dispossess them of the
protection of the ADA.' HIV-infected persons who are unable
to procreate due to sterility, obesity, age and sexual preference
might not enjoy the protections of the ADA because they are
incapable of reproduction independently of their HIV status. 52
It is clear from legislative history that Congress did not intend
to justify discrimination in this manner."3
Alternately, the Bragdon holding suggests that
subsequent courts might protect not only individuals with HIV,
but also people who are unable to procreate due to sterility,
obesity, age and sexual preference,"' thereby extending
protections to recipients not anticipated or intended by
Congress."' Because the Bragdon decision provides fodder for
two new forms of pleadings with contrary dispositions, some
view it as the key to the proverbial Pandora's Box of
litigation. '56
Although the judiciary stirs public compassion when it
expands ADA protection, extending more rights may ultimately
work to devalue and deflate the rights and benefits that others
'5' Id. at 254-55. Mathes states that "[tihe holding that asymptomatic HIV-
infected persons are disabled because of limitations on their ability to reproduce could
be construed to protect only those asymptomatic HIV infected persons who are
otherwise reproductively capable." Id. at 254.
152 Id. at 254.
153 H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
303, 334; S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 22 (1990). See also 136 CONG. REC. H4623 (daily ed.
July 12, 1990) (statement of Rep. Owens); 136 CONG. REC. H4626 (daily ed. July 12,
1990) (statement of Rep. Waxman); 136 CONG. REC. 11,453 (daily ed. May 22, 1990)
(statement of Rep. McDermont); 135 CONG. REC. 19,867 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989)
(statement of Sen. Kennedy), cited in Mathes, supra note 38, at 261 n.128.
154 Mathes, supra note 38, at 253-54.
155 Id. Unfortunately, homosexual American citizens are not a protected social
class, unlike women and racial minorities. Therefore, their due process claims are
reviewed under a rational basis standard, despite their rich history of discrimination.
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). Note, however, that the expansion of the
statutory text in Bragdon might actually reinforce homosexual plaintiffs' legal armory
in discrimination cases in the context of an equal protection violation, if not a due
process violation. Because Hardwick was determined on due process grounds and has
yet to be overturned, an equal protection violation is probably much more vulnerable to
this form of attack. See generally Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
166 See generally Mook, supra note 60, at 1. Mook stated that the Bragdon
decision will undoubtedly be cited by plaintiffs as support for: (1) inclusion within the
definition of disability of innumerable conditions such as cancer that is in remission
and controlled diabetes; (2) the contention that health care plans may not legally
exclude treatment for impotence; and (3) claims that may further complicate the
analysis of who the ADA covers. Id.
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enjoy. As a result of the Bragdon decision, the ADA may not
extend its coverage to subgroups of disabled persons who are
arguably more vulnerable than their counterparts.
The Third Circuit in Doe v. County of Centre, PA,"'
illustrated how injustice results when the judiciary
unintentionally devalues the rights of subgroups of disabled
persons. In Doe, the adoptive parents of "Adam," a child with
AIDS, approached the Foster Child Care Program in County of
Centre, Pennsylvania, seeking to become foster parents.'58 The
county claimed that unless the Does hosted foster children with
the same infectious disease as Adam, and the biological parents
of the foster child executed a written consent in return, the
Does would not be eligible to host a foster child. 9 County
officials claimed foster children should not be exposed to an
"infectious" illness like Adam's.
1 60
The Does refused to comply with the terms of this policy
and sued the county, alleging disability and discrimination in
violation of Title II of the ADA, among other statutes.161 The
Does claimed that because they associated with a person who
had a disability (Adam), it was improper under the ADA to
discriminate against them based on that disability.'62 The
County of Centre justified its disparate treatment of the Doe
family as compared to other potential foster families by relying
on the "direct threat exception" of the ADA, which allows for
discrimination if a disability "poses a direct threat to the health
or safety of others."6' The Third Circuit rejected this and other
justifications, reversing the district court's grant of summary
judgment, and stated that the risk of HIV transmission from
casual contact, even intense physical contact, is negligible."M
The Does argued that they were being denied a public
service (foster care) by virtue of their status as parents of a
child with disabilities.' The Pennsylvania legislature,
157 242 F.3d 437 (3d Cir. 2001).
168 Id. at 444-45.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 441.
162 Doe, 242 F.3d at 447. The ADA additionally prohibits discrimination
against those who are associated with those who are disabled. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4)
(2000).
163 Id. at 447-48. Note that this is the same defense that the defendant in
Bragdon used. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
16 Id. at 451.
161 Id. at 447.
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however, intended that the service provided benefit the foster
child, not the potential foster parents.16  The court never
recognized this distinction. If courts follow Doe's course in
future cases regarding HIV-AIDS and the direct threat
exception, there is potential for devaluation of foster care as a
benefit to foster children. This will disserve subgroups of
disabled children with infectious diseases who may not be
afforded the same protections as other disabled children within
the foster care system. As in Bragdon, the court in Doe did not
consider or foresee the negative ramifications that such flawed
analysis would impose on subgroups of disabled individuals.
17
Another example of problematic precedent is the Court's
decision in Sutton, where it held that myopic plaintiffs were
not entitled to claim disability under the ADA because they
had improved their vision impairments with corrective
lenses.'68 Although this holding appears logical at first blush, it
will have serious, detrimental effects on future disabled
plaintiffs who have mitigated their disabilities with corrective
169
measures.
The Sutton decision represents the Court's blatant
disregard for legislative history. The Senate Report stated,
"whether a person has a disability should be assessed without
regard to the availability of mitigating measures, such as
reasonable accommodations or auxiliary aids." 7° Instead of
disregarding the mitigating measures as directed by the
166 See, e.g., 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2530 (2001) (stating that foster
children should not be placed in a foster home unless a home study containing a
favorable recommendation for placement has been completed); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 5303 (1991) (stating that in making an order for custody, the court should consider
the preference of the child as well as all factors that affect the child's well-being).
167 See Doe, 242 F.3d 437. The Doe opinion is devoid of reference to foster
care's intended benefit to foster children. The court improperly held that the foster
parents were deprived of the benefit, whereas the benefit of foster care and protection
from discrimination in the issuance of the benefit resided with the foster child and was
not for the foster parents to claim.
168 Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 488-89 (1999). The Court in
Sutton discusses mitigating myopia with the assumption that myopia, at least in
extreme forms, is a disability in its unmitigated state. See id. at 475 (stating that
without corrective lenses, each petitioner "effectively cannot see to conduct numerous
activities such as driving a vehicle, watching television or shopping in public stores"). I
adopt the Court's assumption in my discussion of Sutton.
169 As the Supreme Court noted, there are approximately 100 million people
with vision impairments in this country, and if Congress had intended to include all of
them under the umbrella of the ADA, then it would have cited 143 million persons as
disabled Americans instead of the forty-three million that it put forth in its findings.
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 487.
170 S. REP. No. 101-116, at 23 (1989), quoted in Sutton, 527 U.S. at 499
(Stevens & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
[Vol. 68: 2
THE ADA THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS
Senate, the Court imposed its own judgment and failed to cite a
single relevant case that supported this part of its holding. 7'
The Court arrived at its holding by noting the pervasiveness of
nearsightedness, insinuating that it would be absurd to afford
ADA protection to so many people. 72 Noting a report by the
National Council on Disability that defined disability as
"functional disability,"'73 the Court ruled that with corrective
lenses, the plaintiffs had no functional disability because they
could still see.'74 The Court employed its logic outside of legal
rules and thus further complicated the already convoluted term
"substantial limitation."
Sutton's holding that nearsightedness is not a disability
in its corrected state "leads to the perverse result that a person
with a disability who avails him- or herself of the benefits of
technological and medical advances thereby risks losing
protection from job discrimination."'75 Thus, the Court has
instated the following dilemma: the more irrational'76 the
discrimination, the less vulnerable it is to judicial scrutiny."'
Further, the Court opened the door for employer-defendants to
argue that if a disabled person can "mitigate" her situation by
being able to work elsewhere, then the employer-defendants
should avoid liability.
78
The purpose of the Act is to recognize the dignity of
disabled Americans. 179 Giving disabled Americans a chance to
mitigate their disabilities restores their dignity to an extent.
Yet, it might also leave them without the protection of the ADA
in the face of prejudicial treatment. Disabled Americans should
171 Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482-90. The Court based its reasoning on the
application of the "substantially limits" criterion to the facts hi the case. Id. at 482. The
Court stated that the claimants, after using their corrective lenses, were not
.substantially limited" in the major life activity. Id. The Court required that the
claimants be presently-not potentially or hypothetically-substantially limited in
order to demonstrate disability. Id.
... Id. at 484-87. Note that the CRA protects women, who comprise about half
of the population, and minorities, both groups that are well-represented in society.
173 Sutton, 527 U.S. at 485-86.
174 Id.
175 Mayerson & Diller, supra note 14, at 124.
176 If a disabled person mitigates her disabilities, she is less disabled and thus
similar to non-disabled persons. Therefore, entities or persons who discriminate
against her are less rational because the disabled individual functions similarly to non-
disabled persons. The less rational the bias, the more obvious and perhaps
reprehensible it is.
177 Mayerson & Diller, supra note 14, at 124-25.
178 Id.
179 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2000).
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not be forced to prioritize one form of self-help over another;
they should be able to take full advantage of both medical and
legal assistance. This would not only maximize their self-
sufficiency, but also would most successfully effectuate
congressional intent. In its decisions, the Court ignored the
underlying ideology of the ADA, which is about equality of
opportunity-a fair opportunity to perform all jobs for which
one is qualified.
181
3. The Court's Incorrect Interpretation of "Public
Accommodation" Under Title III
For a plaintiff to prevail under a Title III claim, she
must show, among other things, that she was discriminated
against in a place of public accommodation, and that the
defendant operates that place of public accommodation. 8' The
courts not only must determine whether individuals satisfy the
definition of "disabled" under Title III as they do under Title I,
but also have the difficult task of determining whether the
place of business at issue is one of public or private
accommodation.' In an effort to prove that they were
discriminated in a place of "public accommodation," plaintiffs
often choose to show that they are clients or customers of the
defendant.8 3 Ambiguities in proper statutory construction arise
when a court faces a situation wherein it is difficult to tell
whether the plaintiff is a "customer" or an "employee" of the
public accommodation. In such situations, it is important for a
court to examine who is providing the good offered and who is
enjoying the good.' Once a court miscategorizes "customer"
and "employer," it causes Titles I and III to overlap, which in
turn contradicts legislative intent to create two separate and
distinct titles-Title I pertaining to employment and Title III
pertaining to public accommodation.'85
180 Mayerson & Diller, supra note 14, at 125.
181 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).
182 Congress in 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(iv) states "[flor the purposes of
clauses (i) through (iii) of this subparagraph, the term 'individual or class of
individuals' refers to the clients or customers of the covered public accommodation that
enter into the contractual, licensing or other arrangement."
183 The "clients or customers" limitation is set forth in 42 U.S.C. §
12182(b)(1)(A)(iv).
184 id.
18' Brief for Petitioners at *20-21, Martin (No. 00-24), available at 2000 WL
1706732.
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Martin is one example where the Supreme Court
struggled with the definition of "client" or "customer," and in
the end got it wrong. The Court ultimately held that Casey
Martin was a client or customer of the PGA Tour186 and cited
his entrance fee of $3,000 as evidence of his status as customer
under Title III.187 The Court ignored congressional intent to
delineate between audience and performers, and between
merchants and patrons; 8 it is discrimination against buyers,
not sellers, with which Title III is concerned, 88 and legislative
history confirms that "Title III is not intended to govern any
terms or conditions of employment by providers of public
accommodations."190
The PGA is a money-making entity, and Martin is a
highly talented golfer. Thus, the PGA will likely earn
substantial advertising, sponsorship and attendance fees, well
in excess of $3,000, by having Martin participate in the
tournament. 9' Indeed, the district court deemed his
relationship to the tour to be "job related;" his highly esteemed
skills served to enhance both audience attendance and the
PGA's revenues.'92 However, the district court determined that
Martin was an independent contractor and thus exempt from
Title I's protection.'93 Martin won in the Supreme Court by
turning this original argument on its head; instead of pleading
under Title I, he sought the protection of Title III. He argued
that instead of being the performer/employee of the PGA, he
was the recipient of the "goods and services" of the PGA, and
18 This determination meant that Martin was a recipient of goods or services
of the PGA and was therefore entitled to the protection under Title III.
187 Martin, 532 U.S. at 680.
18 See Brief of Amicus Curiae United States Golf Association, Martin (No. 00-
24), available at 1 VA. J. SPORTS & L. 110, 116 (1999) ("Congress drew a line between
the seating area in a movie theater and what appears on the screen. Even though the
theater is a place of public accommodation and the seating area accordingly is covered
by the ADA, the movie need not be closed-captioned.") (citing H.R. REP. No. 101485, pt.
3, at 59 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445,482) [hereinafter USGA Brief].
18 Id. See also Brief for Petitioner at *23-24 ("[w]hen respondent seeks access
to a golf course as a participant in Tour events, he becomes part of the business of
providing entertainment to the spectators. His claim of discrimination about job-
related terms and conditions is thus cognizable, if at all, only under Title I, not Title
III.").
o H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 99 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
267, 382.
191 See Brief for Petitioner at *20-21.
197 Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1245 n.2 (D. Or. 1998).
113 PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 678 (2001). See Birchem v. Knights
of Columbus, 116 F.3d 310, 312 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that Title I of the ADA does not
apply to independent contractors).
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thus a customer."' The Court erroneously endorsed this
argument. Because Martin earned much more money for the
PGA than he received in "goods and services" from the tour, the
Court should have considered Martin an employee, not a
customer, of the PGA Tour.
95
More questions about the definition of "public
accommodation" are left unanswered as a result of Martin."'
For example, "[i]f a law firm obtained exclusive use of a golf
course for a day and invited only its clients to play on that day,
would the golf course be a place of public accommodation....
Or would the character of the venue as public or non-public
depend on its use for that particular day?"'97 Does the Martin
holding now demand that every private club that meets in an
auditorium, a place of public gathering,'98 enroll all interested
disabled members of the general public? Can a contract create
the "client or customer" status, thereby enabling private
individuals to extend the protection of the ADA on their own
terms? 9 Martin suggests that courts will answer these
194 Martin, 532 U.S. at 678.
195 Id. Consider Zimmerman v. Oregon Dept. of Justice, 170 F.3d 1169 (Or. Ct.
App. 1999), which yields an interesting perspective on ADA Title delineation,
specifically the delineation between Titles I and II, and emphasizes the importance of
proper statutory classification. This argument can certainly be used to criticize the
Martin case, even though Martin illuminates the difference between Titles I and III.
Zimmerman describes the difference between Titles I and II in terms of "inputs," such
as employment (Title I), and the "outputs" of a public agency (Title II).
Employment by a public entity is not commonly thought of as a 'service,
program, or activity of a public entity.' Second, the 'action' words in the
sentence presuppose that the public entity provides an output that is
generally available, and that an individual seeks to participate in or receive
the benefit of such an output.
Id. at 1174. In applying the input/output model in the Doe foster care case, a puzzling
problem emerges: What is the output and who gets it-the foster parent or the child?
In applying the Zimmerman model to the Martin case, it seems as if Martin input
much more than he received output. Martin was, therefore, more of an employee than a
customer, and thus, the Martin case should have been considered a Title I case, not a
Title III case. Martin and other golfers inputted their time and energy in order to make
the PGA a lucrative enterprise; Martin's skills and fame earned the PGA Tour money
and sponsorship.
196 Prior to the Menkowitz, discussed infra note 209, and Martin decisions,
however, there was a trend in caselaw toward defining "public accommodation" with
more specificity. For example, the court in Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d
601, 612-14 (3d Cir. 1998), stated that "public accommodation" is "all of the services
which the public accommodation offers, not all services which the lessor of the public
accommodations offers, which fall within the scope of Title III .... Restricting 'public
accommodations' to places is in keeping with the jurisprudence concerning Title II of
the Civil Rights Act ... " Menkowitz, 154 F.3d at 127.
197 USGA Brief, supra note 188, at 117.
198 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(D) (2000).
99 Although the Court in Martin states that contractual relationships will not
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questions in the affirmative when they consider them in the
future. This compromises many of the business and personal
freedoms that Americans have until now taken for granted;
private congregation is no longer private when the government
is in attendance. The Court's holding erroneously expanded
Title III to provide protection to persons who are neither clients
nor customers of public accommodations as defined by the
ADA.
The Martin decision will likely damage the rights and
economic viability of small business owners by expanding the
protection of Title III to independent contractors. 200  The
definition of "public accommodation" includes such places as
restaurants, retail establishments, service establishments and
schools. 20' As a result of the Martin decision, small businesses
that hire independent contractors may be subjected to higher
overhead costs because they may face increased litigation
relating to their hiring and other job-related decisions.2 2
Further, the Martin Court extended Title III beyond clients
and customers to providers of goods and services-entities
meant to be exclusively covered by Title I-thereby providing
an opportunity for plaintiffs to bring Title I claims under the
umbrella of Title 111.211 Plaintiffs can more easily bring a suit
expand a public accommodation's obligations beyond its own clients or customers,
Martin, 532 U.S. at 678, the balance of its language in Martin speaks differently. For
instance, Martin established himself as a client of the PGA in the Court's eyes by
paying the $3,000 entrance fee for the golf tournament, even though Martin's well-
respected status as a golfer surely served to raise revenue for the PGA. The Court
looked to this contractual payment relationship between Martin and the PGA as
evidence of his "client or customer" status and ignored the fact that Martin was
actually an independent contractor outside of the scope of ADA benefits. This implies
that going forward, the judiciary might be more apt to more closely scrutinize terms of
a private agreement established within the context of public accommodation or
employment, rather than examine the reality of the relationship.
200 See Brief for Petitioner at *15-20, *29, Martin (No. 00-24), available at
2000 WL 1706732; Amicus Brief of the Equal Employment Advisory Council in Support
of Petitioner at *13-14, Martin (No. 00-24), available at 2000 WL 1706760.
201 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(A)-(L) (2000). Note that the definition also includes
golf courses. Courts held in cases such as Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752
(9th Cir. 1994) (finding that a national organization formed for the purpose o f public
education was not a place of public accommodation) and Welsh v. Boy Scouts of
America, 993 F.2d 1267, 1269 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding that the Boy Scouts organization
lacked a sufficiently close connection to a "structural facility" to qualify as a public
accommodation), however, that membership organizations that hold meetings and
tournaments at different sites each week lacked the close connection to a particular
facility or location and therefore fall outside the bounds of Title III. USGA Brief, supra
note 188, at 110, 119.




under Title III than under Title I. Before instituting a Title I
claim, a plaintiff must first exhaust administrative remedies by
filing a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC, and the scope
of the civil complaint is usually limited to the charge filed with
the EEOC and the resulting investigation. °4 If the Court in
Martin succeeded in expanding Title III to include Title I, it
undermined the rationale for creating separate titles and made
way for future petitioners to circumvent the more burdensome
procedural requirements of Title .2"5
While the ADA was indeed intended to effectuate
sweeping reform,2 0 6 it is clear that Congress intended to restrict
coverage of the ADA to places that are considered to host
"community activities."2 7 Congress did not intend for the
requirements of the Act to result in the closure of "mom and
pop" neighborhood stores2 8 or the loss of jobs.29 As a result of
the Court's rulings, small businesses may now be negatively
affected by heightened administration costs in the realm of
hiring practices and potential litigation costs.
The Bragdon and Martin decisions, although they are
Title III cases, will also potentially affect the employment
sector, which in turn might disadvantage disabled
Americans.20 Facilitation of litigation will naturally lead to
204 169 A.L.R. Fed. 439 (2001) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117); Reddinger v.
Hosp. Cent. Servs., Inc., 4 F. Supp. 2d 405 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
20 It is interesting to note that courts have heretofore held that Title III was
never meant to apply to the "workplace." Bercovich v. Baldwin Sch., Inc., 133 F.3d 141,
154 (1st Cir. 1998); S. REP. No. 101-116, at 58 (1989).
'o' H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 23 (1990).
207 136 CONG. REC. H2627 (daily ed. May 22, 1990) (statements of
Representative Gejdenson) (stating that the ADA "eases disabled persons' access into
the work force and other central community activities"), cited in USGA Brief, supra
note 188, at 110, 114, 115.
20 Senator Orrin Hatch stated, in support of his proposed amendment to give
tax breaks to small businesses, which have to make appropriate accommodations under
the Act, that:
[slomeone has to pay for our desire, Congress' desire, if you will, to
accommodate persons with disabilities where such accommodations increase
costs. In the case of small businesses, they are required to provide auxiliary
aids and services for their customers when necessary and to provide them
with access so long as doing so does not cause undue burden.... Even though
in theory these requirements impose less costs, these costs will be more than
de minimis where necessary to provide access. For some small businesses,
any additional cost or administrative burden can be very troublesome.
135 CONG. REC. S10,737 (1989).
o9 H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 55 (1990) (discussing the improvement of
business accommodations for the disabled in the financial context of what is "readily
achievable").
210 It is also important to note that Martin's holding seems to fortify a related
[Vol. 68: 2
THE ADA THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS
increased burdens on various private business operations. The
Bragdon decision could burden the implementation of private
employers' practices and policies concerning employment and
insurance. Bragdon made it more difficult for employers to
determine who is covered by the ADA, because they must now
consider undetectable "disabling" conditions such as
asymptomatic HIV.211
The Martin decision will also affect private businesses
to the detriment of disabled Americans. In Martin, the Court
extended the scope of Title III beyond the public access areas
intended by Congress. Consequently, organizations that were
once considered private entities now must comply with the
requirements of Title III. Entities that have multiple types of
business operations that make them quasi-public (described by
Third Circuit decision, Menkowitz v. Pottstown Memorial Medical Center, 154 F.3d 113
(3d Cir. 1998). I suggest that both decisions were improperly decided and that both will
negatively affect the employment sector and the interests of vulnerable social
subgroups, as illustrated by Doe. Doe v. County of Centre, PA, 242 F.3d. 437 (3d Cir.
2001). Menkowitz involved a physician who, upon being diagnosed with attention-
deficit disorder, provided the hospital with a written report that the disorder would not
affect his ability to properly treat patients. Id. at 115. The hospital subsequently
accused him of various infractions of hospital policies, and soon after suspended his
medical staff privileges without notice. Id. The court held that a physician with
attention-deficit disorder, who was not an employee of the hospital, could assert a
claim under Title III of the ADA for denial of "full and equal enjoyment of the goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations of any place of public
accommodation." 154 F.3d at 116 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2000)). The court also
held that because the plaintiff had an arrangement with the hospital more akin to that
of an independent contractor, the plaintiff could take advantage of Title III because the
hospital, a place of public accommodation, was denying him benefits due to his
disability. Id. at 122.
It is clear that the Menkowitz opinion, because it is so similarly related to
Martin, will have effects similar to those of Martin upon subgroups of disabled persons.
The Third Circuit in Menkowitz distorted congressional intent in order to substantiate
its determination that the non-employee physician at the hospital was a customer or
client of the hospital. Id. at 122. Although the Menkowitz court found scant legislative
history to bolster its holding, it gleaned its tenuous justification from a broadly worded
House report which stated that "[tihe purpose of [Tlitle III . . . is to extend these
general prohibitions against discrimination to privately operated public
accommodations and to bring individuals with disabilities into the economic and social
mainstream of American life." Id. at 120 (citing H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 99
(1990) as well as other legislative history that seemingly endorsed such a sweeping
application).
An EEOC amicus brief written in support of the petitioner in Martin most
poignantly refutes the Martin and Menkowitz holdings, stating that "[i]n its zeal to find
a cause find a cause of action, the Third Circuit overlooked the obvious: that the
,service' a hospital provides is medical care to the public, and that the staff privileges of
a particular non-employee doctor are merely antecedent to that service." Brief Amicus
Curiae of the Equal Employment Advisory Council in Support of Petitioner at *16 n.3,
Martin (No. 00-24), available at 2000 WL 1706760.
21 Mathes, supra note 38, at 256-57.
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the Department of Justice as "mixed-use" entities),212 will be
considered public operations and thus have increased
obligations under Title III. For example, a wholesale grocer
who runs a roadside stand selling produce to the public, or a
hotel that has a residential wing and a public wing, must
conform each public and private segment of its facilities to the
provisions of the ADA.213 This is a degree of breadth and burden
not contemplated by Congress, and it is not reflected in the
history or language of the ADA.214
The most important thing that the ADA promises is to
expand the rights and freedoms of disabled Americans. A
combination of statutory limitations and judicial construction,
however, yielded a reality that does not reflect the goals of the
law. Every sophisticated employer is aware of, and wishes to
avoid, the thorny tentacles of the unpredictable ADA.215
Employers might consider a staff consisting of disabled persons
as a source of vulnerability to future ADA violations and
litigation. Therefore, many business entities will likely avoid
hiring disabled employees for fear that the firm will be tapped
of financial and emotional resources if faced with a claim under
the ADA. In the end, the ADA's somewhat draconian provisions
and accompanying judicial unpredictability probably hurt
disabled Americans more than it helped, an outcome contrary
to legislative intent and public policy.
III. THE ADA's FUTURE: ITS POTENCY AND SUCCESS
Fueled by both public sentiment and the genuine need
for sweeping legislative intervention, Congress enacted this
arching piece of legislation but prescribed definite parameters;
those businesses that lack the sophistication, the capital or the
need to employ such physical and procedural accommodations
are exempt from safeguarding their businesses and activities
for the benefit of disabled citizens. Therefore, while it is true
212 Brief Amicus Curiae of the Equal Employment Advisory Council in
Support of Petitioner at *13.
213 Id.
214 Id. at *15.
215 The employment provisions of the ADA apply to only employers that have
"15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in
the current or preceding calendar year .... " 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (2000). However,
nearly all states have laws prohibiting discrimination against disabled employees or
applicants; these laws may affect employers with fewer than fifteen employees. Diane
L. Kimberlin & Linda Ottinger Headley, ADA Overview and Update: What Has the
Supreme Court Done to Disability Law?, 19 REV. LITIG. 579, 582 (2000).
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that Congress intended the ADA to assume an expansive
character,2"6 it is also clear that Congress did not intend to
bestow carte blanche discretion upon the courts to level the
playing field for everyone, irrespective of certain important
functional limitations.217 Conversely, Congress did not intend
for courts to "backlash" against the broad terms of the ADA by
unreasonably restricting plaintiffs' rights.218 Although it is
useful to expound upon statutory text where necessary to
achieve equity, 9 it is equally important for courts to recognize
that the "evil of a decision that applies a standard other than
the one it enunciates spreads in both directions, preventing
both consistent application of the law ... and effective review
of the law by the courts."2 ° Ironically, it is ultimately the
disabled Americans who will suffer the most.
General public policy suggests that most Americans, as
employers, employees, patrons and citizens, would like to see
those who are disabled receive the maximum possible benefit of
protection from the legislature. Society's desire for benevolence,
however, is in tension with its desire to limit the ADA's
assistance to those who are "truly disabled." Unfortunately,
society views those with undetectable impairments with
distrust and suspicion.22' Often, disability is a less apparent
216 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (outlining purpose of ADA); 135 CONG. REC. 19,802
(daily ed. Sept. 7, 1990) (statement of Sen. Harkin quoting Attorney General Richard
Thornburgh) ("We must recognize that passing comprehensive civil rights legislation
protecting persons with disabilities will have direct and tangible benefits for our
country."); Doe v. Kohn Nast & Graf, P.C., 862 F. Supp. 1310, 1320 (E.D. Pa. 1994)
(stating that legislative history of the ADA provides for a broad reading of the ADA).
217 For example, under Title I, once a plaintiff has passed the threshold by
demonstrating that she has a disability under the ADA, she then has the burden to
show that she is qualified to perform the essential functions of her job and that she was
discriminated against because of her disability. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117.
218 See Diller, supra note 16, at 20-21 (implying that the "dismal" outcomes for
plaintiffs in lower courts is in part due to judicial backlash).
219 It has often been argued that when a statute is "applied in situations not
expressly anticipated by Congress[, this] does not demonstrate ambiguity. It
demonstrates breadth." Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
220 Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359 (1998).
22' Eichhorn, supra note 12, at 1444. Eichhorn discusses Reeves v. Johnson
Controls World Services, Inc., 140 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 1998), in the context of determining
the scope of "major life activities." In Reeves, the court held that an agoraphobic
condition, which limited the plaintiffs ability to "take vacations," "go to the shopping
mall alone" and travel "along a route which might cause [one] to cross a bridge or
tunnel," did not limit the plaintiffs major life activity. Eichhorn, supra note 12, at
1444. Eichhorn stated that the court's distrust "coincides with society's desire to assist
only the 'truly disabled' and to view those with invisible impairments with suspicion.
This distrust, in turn, led the court to overlook the obvious disability of a man who
apparently has severe difficulties functioning in the modern world." Id.
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characteristic than race or gender, which might account for
society's measured compassion. The Court seemed attuned to
the tension between society's compassion and society's distrust
when deciding these high-profile cases, and its opinions appear
crafted to invoke political complacency. Although it is
commendable that the Court adjudicated in accordance with
compassionate public policy, the intended benevolent result
may never be realized.22
Predictions about the negative impact that the Court's
opinions will have on the rights of future disabled plaintiffs are
arguably tempered by the limited ability of plaintiffs to bring a
cause of action under the ADA. Ruth Colker, in her essay
entitled ADA Title III: A Fragile Compromise, critiqued Title
III's tenuous framework and its tendency to foster ineffective
and unsuccessful litigation.2 ' Her findings suggest that the
ADA is rarely an effective tool for plaintiffs: "[tihe lack of
success under ADA Title III has been hidden by the seeming
success of the plaintiff in the first major ADA Title III case-
Sidney Abbot [in Bragdon].224 Judging from the overwhelming
number of cases that are filed per year,225 plaintiff success
stories seem to be the exception rather than the rule. According
to Colker, from June 1992 to July 1998, courts rendered only
twenty-five appellate decisions concerning the ADA
generally 221-too few to establish how effectively Title III
remedied problems.227
Colker suggests that the ADA failed to succeed because
it was modeled in part after the CRA, and Congress adopted its
222 The Bragdon, Sutton, Martin and Toyota cases might result in greater
societal distress than they were anticipated to allay. Expansion of the statutory text of
Title III has undoubtedly increased access to the societal privileges and benefits of
public accommodation for many disabled Americans. However, this result came at the
expense of other subgroups of disabled Americans who are arguably more politically
and physically vulnerable.
223 See Colker, supra note 23.
224 Id. at 294 (citing Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998)). Colker credited
the relief given to Abbot to the ideological commitment of both parties to resolve the
matter, rather than to the design of the statute.
225 See Note, Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination, 109
Harv. L. Rev. 1568, 1617 (1996) (stating that as of September 30, 1995, the EEOC
received almost 55,000 ADA charges).
221 Of these twenty-five, defendants prevailed in the lower courts through
either dismissal or summary judgment in 72% of the cases, and after the appellate
process was complete, defendants still prevailed in the majority of the cases. Colker,
supra note 23, at 303.
227 Id. at 302.
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compensatory scheme accordingly.28  Although the CRA
remedial scheme has been effective in defending the rights of
racial minorities who were denied access to public
accommodations, it is too limited for disability cases,229 and
courts have interpreted it too narrowly.2 ' For example, unlike
in racial discrimination cases, remedying disability
discrimination often requires a physical renovation of the
public accommodation, which is often costly; in contrast,
desegregating public accommodations to include minorities and
women would likely increase patronage and, therefore,
revenues. 211 Further, the general construction of the ADA
makes it difficult to file a class action and recover remedies
thereunder.22
Colker's representations regarding the relative lack of
success of the statute are likely an exaggeration; the practical
applications and peripheral effects of the four decisions
discussed in this Note are not captured by statistics or math.
Whatever effectiveness the ADA has is likely due to voluntary
compliance rather than litigation. 22 Further, these cases will
likely increase awareness of the ADA and inspire potential
plaintiffs to test its power via litigation. The question that
remains is whether the mounting litigation will evoke positive
change. As ADA filings continue to mount, many federal courts
have demonstrated their hostility to claims of discrimination
on the basis of disability. 24 But if a high percentage of the cases
results in voluntary compliance, an increase in the number of
cases filed may nonetheless result in increased freedoms for the
disabled. Hopefully, increased voluntary compliance is more
common than refusal to hire the disabled. Unfortunately,
however, the imprecision of the statute and the
unpredictability of the judicial opinions construing it probably
228 See id. at 293-95.
229 Remedying discrimination under the ADA is different than remedying it
under the CRA. One example of the difference is a restaurant not serving a person
because of her ethnicity, as compared to a restaurant effectively denying service by
having a step before the entrance. From a purely economic standpoint, it is more
business savvy to discontinue discrimination against persons because of their race
because it increases patronage. Discontinuing discrimination of the disabled, however,
requires physical revamping of an entire business in some cases, and the threat of
injunctive relief is often not enough to encourage compliance. Id. at 301.
230 Id. at 295.
231 Colker, supra note 23, at 301.
232 Id. at 312 n.17.
233 Id. at 295.
M4 Lanctot, supra note 23, at 328.
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encouraged many hiring employers to avoid hiring the disabled
altogether; this is contrary to the result the drafters of the ADA
intended.
Perhaps the best hope for maximizing the effectiveness
of the ADA would be to positively affect employer attitudes
about persons with disabilities,"5 thereby encouraging them to
hire the disabled, create less discriminatory work policies and
places of public accommodation, and to avoid the convoluted
and costly process of litigation. Grass-root social advancement
incentives, borne of a spirit reminiscent of the 1970s activist
movement,236 would arguably be a more direct and valuable
catalysts for change.
IV. SOME PROPOSED REMEDIES
Both the legislature and the judiciary must reconsider
the structure and application of the ADA to better effectuate
equality for disabled Americans. The definition of "disability"
changes with progression in the medical field and changing
social policies,3 and the judiciary needs direction to react
appropriately. As it stands now, legislative directives
surrounding the definition of "disability" compromise the
legislative intent of the ADA-to instill a sense of respect and
integrity towards and within the disabled community. For
example, the current definition of "disability" is unworkable,
because the "substantially limits a major life activity" phrase
prompts the courts to inquire about inappropriate topics, such
as the severity of the plaintiffs disability status, rather than
focus on the defendant's biased actions.3 8
The inadequacy of the "disabled" definition is further
exemplified when courts are prompted to analyze a claimant's
impairment of the major life activity of working with respect to
a "class" of jobs, not whether the claimant is unable to perform
the tasks associated with her specific job. 9 These erroneous
inquiries ignore the value of the job with respect to individual
2" Andrew I. Batavia, Ten Years Later: The ADA and the Future of Disability
Policy, in AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES, supra note 14, at 283, 289.
216 See discussion supra Part I.A.
237 See generally CLAIRE H. LIACHOWITZ, DISABILITY AS A SOCIAL CONSTRUCT
(1988) (discussing the background of social politics). Liachowitz wisely stated that
.social policies help to create disability and social policies can help to erase it." Id. at
107.
28 Eichhorn, supra note 212, at 1469.
131 Id. at 1454.
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preference and disregard the underlying equality of
opportunity ideology of the ADA, which guarantees a fair
opportunity to perform all jobs for which one is qualified.24 ° In
every case, the nature of the investigation (a plaintiff-centered
focus) compromises the disabled individual's personal integrity.
Instead, Congress should borrow an approach utilized in
tort practice. The statute should direct courts to scrutinize the
defendants' biased actions more closely, putting the burden on
the plaintiff to show that the defendant acted in a
discriminatory way, rather than demand that the plaintiffs
shoulder the burden of proving disability from the outset.
According to classic tort law, in intentional tort cases, liability
is extended to the defendant even in cases where the defendant
could not easily have foreseen the resulting harm to the
plaintiff "upon the obvious basis that it is better for unexpected
losses to fall upon the intentional wrongdoer than upon the
innocent victim." 4" The courts should use this test-a
defendant's affirmative act, paired with intent to discriminate
against a disabled plaintiff to ascertain violations of the ADA.
This test would remove the burden from the plaintiffs to prove
their disabilities and would therefore promote judicial
efficiency by establishing a presumption of disability. In the
rare case that the plaintiff is not disabled, the defendant
should shoulder the burden of rebutting the presumption. As it
stands now, the plaintiff is victimized both by the
discriminatory actions of the defendant and by the burdensome
pleading requirements of the ADA. This proposal would better
empower disabled Americans within society and within the
courtroom.
Judicial construction of the ADA must be revamped. In
determining what is or is not a disability, the Court should
adopt Sutton's case-by-case approach242 (but not its attention to
mitigating factors) rather than Bragdon's generalized
approach. For example, in Bragdon it is evident that a case-by-
case approach to major life activity would have been more
24 Mayerson & Diller, supra note 14, at 125.
241 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 40 (5th ed. 1984)
(citing Watson v. Rheinderknecht, 82 Minn. 235 (1901); Vosberg v. Putney, 80 Wis. 523
(1891), amongst others).
U2 In Sutton, the Court required the claimants to show why the physical
impairments substantially limited their specific "major life activities." Sutton v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 481, 483 (1999). Claimants had to show that they
performed these specific life activities and that their disabilities significantly deterred
them from performing these activities. Id. at 483.
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effective and precise in affording protection to those disabled
Americans who actually need it. The Court determined that
asymptomatic HIV qualifies as a disability because it affects
the major life activity of reproduction,243 thereby excluding
individuals who should receive protection of the ADA and
including those who should not. If the Court had required a
searching inquiry into whether the plaintiffs inability to
reproduce impaired her ability to carry out her own unique life
functions, the interest of justice and equity would have been
better served.
Although the case-by-case analysis would provide for
more equity in dispensation of statutory protection, it has
drawbacks, including the risk of increased administrative
costs. 244 Case-by-case analyses bestow too much discretion upon
the judiciary to conclude that many apparently disabling
conditions do not fit within the ambit of the statute.245 Each
ADA plaintiff potentially will be considered in a vacuum.2 46
Therefore, not only is it possible that judicial construction will
exclude many persons in need of protection from the shelter of
the ADA, but it is also possible that the ADA will operate to
impose "massive confusion" upon employers and lower courts.247
Disability cases have caused massive confusion in the courts as
it is, as a result of the myriad of nuanced constructions that the
Court has superimposed upon the ADA. As long as Congress
maintains its position that the inquiry is to be centered upon
the disability of the claimant, rather than the alleged misdeeds
of the defendant, the Court should choose one path of
construction Sutton's individualized, case-by-case analysis.
The Supreme Court should also better observe the
ADA's legislative history. Where the legislative directive is
clear, as in cases regarding mitigation of disability and in cases
concerning the construction of the term "public
accommodation," the Court continually overlooks congressional
intent.248 Critics suggest that the Court finds license to distort
243 Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 639 (1998).
244 For a more in-depth discussion, see Mathes, supra note 38, at 259-60.
245 Lanctot, supra note 23, at 331.
246 Id.
247 Id. at 332-33.
248 For example, in Sutton, legislative history specifically stated that upon
evaluating a person's disability, his or her mitigating or corrective measures should not
be taken into account; the majority did not recognize this in their reasoning. Sutton v.
United Air Lines Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 499-500 (1999) (Stevens, J. dissenting) (citing S.
REP. No. 101-116, at 23 (1989)). Also, the Martin majority disregarded the
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the statutory text through its own pity and benevolent
compassion rather than through legislative mandate. 49
Regardless of the motivation, the Court continues to overstep
its bounds. For example, the Court in Martin took what should
have ended as a failed Title I case and tried it as a Title III
case, disregarding the clear legislative directive to delineate
between employer and patron, and private and public
accommodation. 5 ' The Court ignored legislative direction and
legal ramifications and thus erroneously expanded and
distorted the text of the ADA.
251
Additionally, perhaps expansion of state legislation will
compensate for these congressional and judicial inadequacies.
After passage of the CRA, many states passed their own civil
rights legislation that provided broader remedial provisions
than Congress provided in the CRA.252 Unfortunately, the ADA
has not spurred a similarly strong state response.2 53 Although
nearly every state has statutes prohibiting disability
discrimination at places of public accommodation, many of the
statutes are antiquated.254 There is great room for improvement
within the state statutory schemes, and therefore if states are
persuaded to update their statutes, they might be persuaded to
improve their remedial schemes as well.25 For example, states
probably have a more comprehensive understanding of their
own commercial residents' accommodation inadequacies and
can promulgate enactments that most effectively address these
shortcomings. The most successful cure for statutory
inefficiencies might be for states to "gap fill" in order to
compensate for the ineffectiveness of federal legislation.
client/customer language set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(iv) (2000). See PGA
Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 693 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
49 See Martin, 532 U.S. at 691 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting) ("In my
view today's opinion exercises a benevolent compassion that the law does not place it
within our power to impose."); Mayerson & Diller, supra note 14, at 125 ( "By
attempting to limit the ADA to the 'truly disabled,' the Supreme Court continues to
look at disability as a matter for pity rather than equality.").
260 Martin, 532 U.S. 661.
25 Id. at 691 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
252 Colker, supra note 23, at 306-09.
m Id. at 306.
254 Id. at 308.
215 Id. Yet, because the states usually use the federal government as a
'benchmark" for discerning what the proper parameters of the statute should be,
perhaps the only significant change would come about if the federal government were




The goals and structure of the ADA are so broad and
ambitious that they have led to ambiguity in construction.
Ambiguity in turn has led to judicial expansion and contraction
of the text. Both of these phenomena have frustrated the
legislative intent to provide protection to those who actually
need it. Congress needs to step in and redefine the statutory
parameters so that the analytical lens is focused on the
defendant's deleterious acts of discrimination rather than on
the nature of the claimant's disability. "The success of future
disability policy will depend upon the extent to which it
continues to empower individuals to achieve their goals."256 The
ADA can only empower individuals to achieve their goals if the
statute is enveloped with a quality of legitimacy, which is a
product of sound draftsmanship and application.
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